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In an attempt to move forward from the historical 
reconstruction of postwar American foreign policy in the labor 
field, which has been studied in several works on the Marshall Plan 
years, this paper discusses a few of their interpretative 
conclusions, and addresses a few larger issues about the boom of 
the European economies in the 1950s and 1960s.
It can safely be said that the American effort in the labor 
sphere, particularly with the Marshall Plan, aimed at a radical 
change of the landscape of industrial relations and a thorough 
reshaping of European trade unions' practices. This is precisely 
what most of the newdealers and the unionists inside the Economic 
Cooperation Administration intended to achieve. By and large they 
did not succeed, and the reasons why such an overambitious goal was 
not reached give us a few insights into the nature of the economic 
and political reconstruction of Western Europe.
Two different but converging types of historical studies have 
explored the origins, the implementation and, only to a minor 
extent, also the actual impact of the diplomatic and economic 
policies developed by the Americans on what they used to call the 
"labor front" of the Cold War. The first were those by labor 
historians who looked at the chain of political events that brought 
to an end, at the beginning of the Cold War, both the strategy for 
structural reforms and the framework of large political unity which 
the trade unions of most European countries had inherited from the 
antifascist resistance. On the European side, such studies focused 




























































































of sweeping reforms devised in 1945. When the emerging Cold War 
division, in 1947-8, precipitated a global confrontation between 
left and right - in France, Italy, Germany and Greece - trade 
unions had to give up their attempts to become a factor of central 
importance in the political life of each nation. The ambitious 
programs for nationalizations, institutionalized workers' controls 
and a decisive role of trade unions in dictating macroeconomic 
policies were be dropped, and substituted with a frustrating return 
into the lesser realm of economic bargaining within industry1.
The most visible aspect of such process was the break-down of 
the coalition of various political tendencies inside the labor 
movement. The united labor confederations born at the end of the 
war were split, as in France and Italy; anticommunist purges and 
bitter fights between a communist left-wing and a Christian or 
socialdemocratic righ-wing ended the antifascist unity of action 
in every European country - and even in the USA. This deep 
realignment of labor forces was best symbolized by the break-up of 
the World Federation of Trade Unions, which remained an essentially 
communist organization after the split of the TUC, the CIO and all 
the Christian and socialdemocratic European federations, which 
gathered in a rival International Confederation of Trade Unions in 
1949.
European labor studies have focused on the split as the most 
evident sign and factor of labor's historical defeat. In an attempt 
to explain the diminished societal role forced upon unions by the 




























































































government and unions. This factor has obviously been most 
prominent in the studies about Germany - where the occupations 
authorities, staffed and advised by American unionists, played an 
important part in the rebuilding of a western-oriented trade union 
movement in those about Italy, Greece and France - where 
American unionists helped the formation of anti-communist labor 
organizations; and particularly in the studies on international 
labor diplomacy. On this latter subject, both European and American 
historians have quite convincingly demonstrated how a very close 
and interactive cooperation between the two American labor 
federations and the US government acted as the main force in 
precipitating the global confrontation which split the 
international labor movement2. The main contribution of these 
studies was to emphasize the international dimension of postwar 
trade union policies, stressing how labor problems had turned into 
one of the key issues of the international conflict. A new pattern 
of mutually advantageous collaboration between unions and 
governments was emerging in the international arena, and this was 
most evident in the American case. But most of these studies 
stopped short of what was clearly the key factor: Marshall aid and 
the economic choices related to it. They mentioned the European 
Recovery Program as the formal issue around which European labor's 
debate had turned into an irreversible break, but did not analyze 
it: thus failing to reconnect international labor policies with the 
dynamic of economic reconstruction. The negative effect of this 




























































































labor - prevented also a clear understanding of the aims and actual 
achievements of the US policies towards European labor3. Because 
the central pillar which supported the whole American vision of a 
stabilised European society was precisely the economic action 
embodied in the ERP.
Therefore, we have to turn to the studies on the Marshall Plan 
and European reconstruction to find the second, most interesting 
portion of literature on the subject. All the studies concerned 
with the political impact of the Marshall Plan on European labor 
have substantially relied on Charles S. Maier's concept of "the 
politics of productivity". Maier emphasized the appeal on the 
moderate left of a proposal for economic growth as the main key to 
social harmony and stability. A larger and constantly increasing 
output would bring prosperity to all sections of society, and this 
would avoid class conflict which - in the American vision - arose 
primarily from scarcity. Social conflict had not only to be 
contained, but channeled into an a-political framework of 
consensual bargaining among organized interests. Reflecting 
America's own experience throughout the New Deal and wartime 
mobilization in an idealized fashion, the Marshall Plan offered a 
vision of social consensus based on an ever-growing national 
income. Growth had to be considered as the common interest of 
industry and labor, whose organizations ought to orient their 
mutual relationship toward the superior aim of an improved economic 
performance. Thus, growth came to be seen as the prerequisite for 




























































































industrial relations, which would accomplish the essential function 
of sharing and spreading the benefits of increased productivity 
throughout society4.
Two important implications of such a proposal need to be 
emphasized. First, the ERP appeared, from its very beginning, not 
only as a policy best suited to reach the strategic goals of the 
US in the Cold War, nor just as a project for international 
economic coordination, but - much more comprehensively - as a 
social philosophy addressed to European society at large, and 
particularly to industry and workers. Second, and precisely because 
of such broad social character of its main thrust, it called upon 
the main forces and institutions of American society to actively 
participate in its development and implementation. It was 
particularly American labor that was called into action, because 
trade unions were obviously best equipped and legitimized to sell 
the plan's productivist message to their European counterparts. 
Such an interventionist role had a strong appeal upon American 
unionists, and for very good reasons: it allowed them to forge a 
badly needed working alliance with their own government; it 
supplemented their bid for international labor leadership with 
strong political and economic foundations; and, even more 
excitingly, it projected American unions themselves as live models 
of a new and allegedly successful way of interpreting labor trade 
unionism in the postwar world.
With the launching of the Marshall Plan and its immediate 




























































































was powerfully and directly brought to bear upon labor unions' most 
vital strategic choices. The economic and social nature of the 
American proposal turned the previously abstract issues of 
international conflict into very practical and inescapable matters 
of economic policies, social alliances, political alignments and 
bargaining attitudes. Inside most European unions, the struggle 
between radical and moderate elements precipitated into a final 
clash about the actual prospects for growth and for the improvement 
of workers' income and standing. Socialdemocrats and Christians, 
so far fearful of breaking the unity of labor federations, found 
in the Marshall Plan an economic rationale with which they could 
counter the communists' emphasis on structural reforms. The 
prospect of prosperity brought by American aid could be offered to 
the rank and file as a promising way to raise its standard of 
living. By joining their national governments and industrialists 
in large, powerful centrist coalitions, they could effectively 
corner the communists in an apparently 'destructive', negativist, 
untenable isolation. On the international stage, the gathering of 
liberal, socialist and Christian unions around the Marshall Plan 
proposal - a process forcefully fostered by the activism of 
American trade unionists -offered them a new, inviting setting: a 
large family of labor organizations to which they could comfortably 
belong without feeling as isolated splitters of their own national 
labor bodies5
Thus in 1948, when the non-communist unions of Western Europe 




























































































international labor aquired an irresistible momentum. The split of 
the French CGT had just taken place, the one of the Italian CGIL 
came after a few weeks, and the formal unity of the World 
Federation of Trade Unions collapsed in less than a year. By early 
1949 the American initiative had achieved its first and foremost 
political goal in the labor sphere: European unions were definitely 
divided in two opposite camps, and the vast majority of Western 
European unions actively supported the ERP, in a few cases even 
betting their own future upon its success. The communist opposition 
in France and Italy became vulnerably weak, isolated and challenged 
by new, small but verbally aggressive competing unions backed by 
governments and by the whole international machinery set in motion 
by the ERP. With the establishment of the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, in 1949, an optimistic mood 
pervaded ECA planners and American unionists. Now that the 
political and organizational framework of European labor had been 
drastically reshaped in accordance with their hopes and desires, 
the time seemed ripe for challenging the traditional pattern of 
industrial relations, and restructuring it along the lines of the 
American model6. But this task proved much harder and far less 
successful.
In the view of the newdealers and unionists which staffed the 
ECA, the cycle of growth spurred by Marshall aid had to be matched 
by an almost concomitant improvement of all sections of national 
income. Investments were the key to further growth, but wages had 




























































































of the benefits of the 'prosperous capitalism' promised by the 
ERP. The need for such a betterment of workers' standard of living 
was considered particularly crucial and urgent in those countries 
where political stability had just been achieved and looked still 
dangerously precarious: France, Germany, Italy. In the Cold War 
frame of mind and scale of priorities, these countries were not 
only central factors for the economic recovery of the continent, 
but also the very front-line of the political confrontation 
between East and West. Since unions were seen as the major factor 
for the integration of workers into increasingly prosperous 
democracies, it was particularly in these countries that the newly 
established non-communist labor organizations had to become 
successful, powerful, appealing to the workers and effectively 
integrated in the mechanism of growth. The answer to these 
simultaneous necessities was to be found, according to the ECA, in 
a steady improvement of productivity and in the establishment of 
an efficient, consensual, pluralistic bargaining structure which 
would provide for a socially balanced distribution of the gains of 
productivity among all the factors of production. A constant, 
smoothly running subdivision of the bigger cake was deemed to be 
the pillar upon which rested the social and political stability of 
Western Europe. The economics of growth obviously applied to all 
the other participating countries as well, but in the UK and in the 
northern countries nobody feared any major threat to political 
stability, and the productivity drive had less ambitious 




























































































competition and expanding industrial output. No small goals; but 
nothing as far-reaching as the ambition to restructuring the 
economic and institutional foundations of social bargaining, which 
was ECA's dream for France, Germany and Italy7.
The ECA, the American unionists posted in Europe and the 
Labor Attaches in the US embassies set the productivity drive 
effectively in motion in 1950. It went hand in hand with the 
reiterated American efforts towards the integration of the national 
economies in a continental market. The economic motives for both 
campaigns were exactly the same: liberalization and integration 
would stimulate competition, make larger economies of scale 
possible, increase productive and distributive efficiency. Thus a 
larger output with lesser costs would provide consumers with an 
increasing amount of cheap, affordable products. Prosperity would 
bring the social integration of workers, thence assuring political 
stability. Thousands of unionists, employers and technicians were 
sent to the US to see by themselves how competitive mass-production 
could normalize social conflict and reduce tensions to manageable 
proportions. The propaganda and educational aspect was just as an 
essential part of the productivity drive as the technical effort 
to implant new machinery and organizational methods in European 
factories8.
In political terms, however, the very core of the program was 
the attempt to conform industrial relations to the axioms of the 
politics of productivity: in the interest of political stability 




























































































balanced distribution of the benefits of higher productivity was 
just as essential as the actual achievement of increased 
efficiency. They were the two sides of the same coin. No major 
improvements in productivity were deemed possible without the 
cooperation, or at least the aquiescence, of workers and unions. 
On the other hand, if higher productivity did not generate higher 
wages and levels of consumption, social peace and democratic 
stabilization would have very few chances to last. Thus unions and 
employers had to be brought at the same table, where - under the 
supervision of governments and ECA missions - they would work out 
plans for close cooperation in cost-cutting and efficiency- 
increasing devices. In return for their collaboration, unions would 
receive recognition and higher benefits; communist trade unions 
were obviously to be kept out of this scheme. As soon as the 'free' 
trade unions proved able to deliver at least some tangible goods 
to their rank and file, workers would desert the left-wing 
organizations and the communist threat would gradually vanish from 
the political scene. A virtuous cycle of growth, social integration 
of cooperative organized interests, and spreading prosperity would 
thus liberate Europe from class-oriented conflicts.
At first, the sheer abstractedness of such a vision did not 
in the least deter the American planners. But the productivity 
drive did rapidly stumble into growing obstacles. Employers were 
not particularly keen about granting unions - even 'free' trade 
unions - any relevant role in what we would today call a neo- 




























































































profitably take advantage of the overall weakness of a divided 
labor movement whose bargaining power was reduced to a minimum by 
its own internal fractures - as in Italy and France -, and by a 
high rate of unemployment - as in Italy and Germany. Since 
communist unions were substantially delegitimized and even 
repressed, and since 'free' trade unions could not resort to open 
conflict - for their structural weakness and their commitment to 
political stability - the productivity drive could very well be 
used by industry to cut its costs, accelerate its restructuring and 
increase profits, without being immediately forced to grant any 
substantial benefit to workers.
National governments, on the other hand, had a firm commitment 
to stimulate growth and higher investments but, at least in the 
early 1950s, did not share the political urge expressed by ECA 
planners for an immediate, vast increase of the internal demand of 
consumer goods. Stable wages served the competitive restructuring 
of each national economy much better than politically determined 
concessions to trade unions. As long as the combination of Cold War 
anti-communism and of a very elastic supply of labor kept trade 
union pressures under control, even 'free' trade unions had really 
no leverage for their claim to higher wages and a positive 
recognition of their bargaining role. As unions started to grumble 
about the lesser role to which they were forced, and eventually 
dropped out of most of the schemes devised by the productivity 
drive, some ECA officials came to realise that their plans might 




























































































strained to their very extremes the incompatible economic and 
political goals of the newdealists' vision. The American plans 
appeared theoretically coherent, but the failure to implant in 
Europe a system of neo-corporatist, well balanced arrangements for 
power-sharing among organized interests under public supervision, 
eventually revealed, more than anything else, that the Americans 
could be suggestive but certainly not all-mighty.
The tripartite productivity agencies or committees set up in 
each country worked very well as a source of technical and 
organizational education for managers and engineers. They certainly 
increased the familiarity of European firms with low-cost mass- 
production techniques; and the credits, machinery and know-how 
provided by American aid accelerated the modernization of many 
plants. But the committees for productivity did never manage to 
become a clearing-house for industrial disputes, nor the setting 
for far-reaching agreements between organized interests. In most 
cases, unions abandoned them after several frustrated attempts to 
force employers and governments into concessions - either political 
or economic - which simply was not in their power to obtain. In 
several experiments set up in the so called 'pilot plants', union 
participation in operating new and more productive techniques was 
seldom compensated with negotiated wage increases. At best, 
employers handed out productivity bonuses on an individual basis, 
thus further undermining unions' representation and strength. In 
most cases, however, workers received very little compensation from 




























































































drive resulted in a reduction of the labor force. To the utter 
despair of the American advisors, employers often refused even to 
decrease their sale prices and give up cartel arrangements, which 
were the main liberalizing aims of the whole campaign for 
productivity. French and Italian employers often replied to the 
preoccupations of ECA officials by saying that their problem was 
not bargaining with the 'free' trade unions, but rather with the 
communist ones, which remained relatively larger in the 
manufacturing sector. But these unions, in turn, were extremely 
weakened and directly threatened by the lay-offs and the 
restructuring of industry9. So that the circle was effectively 
closed, at the best advantage of industry. As a result, rates of 
unionization rapidly dropped: in Germany, the main industrial 
unions barely preserved their membership, even though the overall 
labor force was growing. In Italy the number of union members in 
manufacturing decreased throughout the 1950s. In France, between 
1950 and 1955, unionization collapsed: the overall figure of union 
members was cut down in half, and did not begin to increase again 
until 1960. The level of strikes went down even more dramatically 
during the whole decade, and started to rise again only in 1958-9. 
More importantly, only a small rate of strikes concerned successful 
demands for higher wages or other benefits. In most cases it was 
a matter of resisting against lay-offs or dismissals10. Union 
activity, for most of the 1950s, was defensive in character and 




























































































By 1953-4, most of the newdealists involved in the management 
of foreign aid - and most noticeably those with a labor union 
background - were talking with guite explicit bitterness of a 
defeat of their efforts. They blamed European employers and 
governments for an allegedly 'feudal' conception of capitalism, a 
preference for unilateral domination rather than pluralist 
interaction in the sphere of industrial relations, a short-sighted 
neglect of the necessity for an economy of prosperous consumption 
extended also to the working class. But they also charged the 
'free' trade unions, rather inconsistently, of being too rigidly 
committed to the stability of anticommunist coalitions and thus 
rather shy, submissive and not enough militant in claiming a 'fair 
share' of the growing national income for workers11. As a matter of 
fact, French and Italian 'free' trade unions, even in those sectors 
where they had some relevant presence, were able to exert a 
successful pressure only in the few, rare occasions when they 
joined their efforts with the communist federations, in ill- 
disguised and very short-lived united fronts. Even the united and 
relatively powerful German DGB had very little chances to put 
forward strong demands: the labor market was flooded with large 
numbers of incoming eastern refugees; employers could make 
profitable deals, at company level, with the work councils rather 
than with the unions; and the defeat of 1950-2 on the extension of 
codetermination outside the coal and steel industry left the labor 
organizations excluded from the institutional arrangement which 




























































































both industry and government. In none of these countries the Cold 
War years brought into being a cohesive structure of neo- 
corporatists negotiating bodies and practices between labor, 
industry and government. The boom of the European economies grew 
in an environment marked by the temporary marginalization, if not 
exclusion, of labor as a relevant and influential social partner12.
Even those historian who tend to stress the far-reaching 
impact of the American neo-capitalist vision agree that the 
European economic structures and institutions were only half- 
Americanized. As late as 1957 even an official and quite 
propagandistic history of the productivity drive, by the American 
agency in charge of foreign aid, had to admit that while the 
technical results of the campaign for industrial efficiency were 
very good, its social achievements lagged far behind. In relation 
to the Italian case the pamphlet stated that no great advancement 
was foreseeable as long as unemployment did not drop to much lower 
levels (which, by the way, was finally just beginning to happen)13.
In historical perspective, the American attempt to export into 
Europe an a-political, productivity-oriented system of industrial 
relations based on business-unionism and corporate liberalism is 
puzzling not just for its practical failure but particularly for 
its inherent, domestic weakness. After all, European labor, after 
a decade of hardship, did grow more powerful and influential. In 
the 1960s, when full employment was reached on the whole continent, 
and the Cold War paralyzing divisions were overcome and substituted 




























































































effective actors of economic and political bargaining. They 
reinforced their function as negotiating agent for wage earners 
through a rather comprehensive and overtly political role as 
central factors in the management of general welfare systems and, 
wherever they could, in macroeconomic-policy decision-making. At 
the beginning of the 1950s, on the other hand, the apparently 
powerful and proud American unions were entering a phase of bright, 
although limited, economic gains but - generally speaking - of 
historical decline as an influential force in society. Throughout 
the 1950s they managed to consolidate a relatively privileged 
economic condition for unionized workers of mass-production 
manufacturing. But they were completely unable to extend the 
boundaries of collective bargaining and assume a negotiating role 
for the constantly growing non-unionized sector of the labor force; 
they also failed to stimulate and encourage the establishment of 
public, all-encompassing institutions of social welfare, and 
remained confined in the management of privatized welfare plans 
restricted to the labor force of a few big companies. Thus, their 
influence as a central element in political and macroeconomic 
negotiations kept constantly declining, and it was already reduced 
to a comparatively minor degree well before the crisis of the 1970s 
and the process of de-industrialization began to endanger unionism 
all over the industrialized world14.
What is most striking is that American labor and liberal 
leaders - who came to Europe with the notion that the traditionally 




























































































the past - were convinced that no such decline was in sight for 
them. To the contrary, in Cold War years they held an optimistic 
view, persuaded as they were that the domestic legacy of the 1940s 
(especially the war-time experience) spelled the inevitable success 
of a prosperous capitalism whose social imbalances could be 
effectively cured by labor's role in privatized collective 
bargaining. Productivism and industrial democracy appeared to them 
as the triumphant solution that could defeat stagnation and class- 
based conflicts, while making unions more powerful and workers much 
better off15.
Only one substantial explanation can be advanced for such a 
profound misjudgement of the historical prospect ahead. And that 
is that such a mistaken perception was made possible by the unique 
situation enjoyed by American industry on the international markets 
in postwar years. When America's output represented 40% of world 
GNP and all her competitors were faced with the basic task of 
reconstruction, newdealists and CIO leaders could well believe in 
the long-term and universal successfulness of a model of unionism 
based only on a strategy of industrial bargaining that was to 
deliver economic benefits just to limited sectors of the working 
population. But such a self-deceiving approach could hold only as 
long as American manufacturers had a strong advantage in 
productivity levels; as long as an unchallenged domination of 
markets large enough as to allow for substantial economies of scale 
could make relatively high wages affordable. In short, as long as 




























































































production industries - automobile is the most evident example - 
could step up productivity primarily by extending their scale of 
operations, rather than intensifying production. Under such 
conditions, well organized business-unionism could very well 
exchange a commitment to increased productivity for higher wages 
and benefits: because the net slightly inflationary result did not 
immediately endanger the big manufacturers' domination of markets. 
However, such a strategy for labor was to be decisively challenged
- as we very well know today - as soon as the first German or 
Japanese cars entered the American market.
It then becomes evident that the golden decades of American 
unions' economic success - the 1940s and 1950s - did not indicate 
a universally valid model of social betterment through collective 
bargaining: this was American labor's delusion during the Marshall 
Plan. To the contrary, they reflected a unique, unexportable and 
unrepetead situation of America's relative isolation from the 
constraints of interdependence and the competitive pressures of the 
world economy.
Evidently, this was not the case for European industry and 
labor. As a matter of fact, the model proposed by the Americans was
- given the actual strength and ambitions of European labor - a 
goal at the same time too difficult to reach and not enough 
rewarding. It was too much in the short term, and too little in the 
long-run. The American project looked forward to the constructive 
interaction of unions and employers to take place in a privatized, 




























































































consensual commitment to growth and productivity, labor and 
industry were to negotiate an efficient and equitable timing both 
for the stepping up of productivity and the subdivision of its 
growing returns. This was supposed to take place under the umbrella 
of macroeconomic decisions and guidelines set by the interplay of 
market forces and government policies theoretically beyond the 
reach of organized interests' bargaining. Thus, it implied the 
integration of labor unions in negotiating mechanisms mainly at the 
level of single firms or, at best, of industrial sectors. The 
national committees for productivity did never resemble - except 
in the dreams of very few unionists - anything like an influentual 
body making decisions on macroeconomic issues. And integration of 
organized interests in power-sharing bodies at a supranational 
level was an even more unrealistic fantasy that only very few 
American advisors took into consideration. But the firm or industry 
level was exactly the ground upon which unions, in the first half 
of the 1950s, had very little ability to exert pressures and 
achieve influence, when overall policies where not explicitly 
directed to favour and enforce labor demands.
The crux of the matter was a very elastic labor market. After 
the defeat of the politically oriented strategy for structural 
reforms and the enforcement of stabilization policies in 1947-49, 
labor was confronted with tough economic conditions. High rates of 
unemployment undermined the potentiality of wage demands and tamed 
unions into a defensive attitude. Where a sharp split of labor 




























































































competition and infighting between different unions allowed 
employers to play one against the other, thus regaining an almost 
undisputed ability to fix wages and conditions. Besides, the Cold 
War climate of heavy-handed anticommunism, which turned every real 
or threatened interruption of industrial peace into a burning 
political issue, further restrained labor ability and inclination 
to successfully use industrial action.
Of even greater importance, however, were the dynamic changes 
of labor market conditions and the new trends in manpower supply 
underlying the early boom. The simple quantitative statistics on 
unemployment do not completely reveal the extent or the nature of 
the difficulties faced by trade unions, and could not explain the 
crisis and weakness of unionism in France, where there was no basic 
unemployment problem. But if we look at the changing patterns of 
labor supply in manufacturing industry, we begin to get a clearer 
picture. Throughout the investment boom of the early 1950s and even 
later, we see a more of less pronounced but quite deep, continuous 
alteration in the composition of the labor force. A constant, 
growing and sometime huge inflow of new workers matched the surge 
of investments in manufacturing and construction. In some cases 
(Germany and Italy are the best examples) the sheer quantity of 
this new, elastic supply of labor seems to account for the 
stability of wages16.
In general, however, it is probably the qualitative factor 
that can best explain the roots of unions' weakness. The new 




























































































artisan craft-shops, in some case from abroad. They came from 
situations of very low income, underemployment or lack of 
employment altogether, sometime outright poverty. To most of them, 
industrial wages - however low and slowly growing - represented a 
net improvement in standard of living, and industrial employment 
a decisive betterment in occupational stability. Their adjustment 
to industrial and urban life, and sometime to a new country, might 
have been culturally tough, but the net income gains were 
sufficiently convincing as to make them stick not only to 
industrial employment (there wasn't much choice anyway), but also 
to an initially subdued and undemanding attitude towards working 
conditions. Most of them had very little, if any, previous 
experience of union organization and collective bargaining, and did 
not share with the older workers any tradition of political and 
union activism. In France and Italy, in several cases, they were 
recruited through strongly politically-biased channels - church, 
'free' trade unions, political parties - which obviously 
discriminated against potential militant and troublemakers.
Vis a vis this new and growing group of workers there was, 
especially concentrated in manufacturing, an older generation of 
skilled and experienced workers who had entered industry before or 
during the war. In general, they had a more cohesively collective 
and militant attitude, in several cases had participated in 
resistance movements, and had everywhere been the backbone of the 
short but intense season of union rebuilding at the end of the war. 




























































































social group which had most decidedly hoped for structural social 
changes in the postwar period, and they represented by far the most 
important segment of all unionized workers. In fact, they were the 
very foundation of unions and even more radically so in the case 
of the communist and leftist-oriented ones. It was their bargaining 
strength - however precarious - that had been lowered and then 
broken with the collapse of coalition governments, the defeat of 
radical reformist strategies, the split of union federations, the 
useless struggles against the Marshall Plan, the policies of 
stabilization. Between 1947 and 1949 they had been politically and 
socially defeated, and in the Cold War years they ended up being 
represented by union federations quite delegitimized and almost 
powerless, as in France and Italy (or, as in Germany, by unions 
which had to painfully adapt to conditions of limited influence)17.
As the boom gained momentum, the growing supply of a new labor 
force, coupled with the intense restructuring and modernization of 
production, transformed the unionized, militant sector of the 
manufacturing working class in an encircled group which could not 
effectively oppose or resist the introduction of new productive 
techniques and the lay-offs that went with them, nor could push 
demands for higher wages. The political division of the trade union 
federations, where it existed, simply reflected and multiplied this 
substantial economic weakness. While the communist unions wasted 
their little strength in vain attempts to resist the restructuring 
of industry, the Christian and socialdemocratic ones just could not 




























































































market, to put forward forceful demands which took advantage of the 
growth cycle. In Italy real wages, in the 1950s, did not rise as 
fast as productivity. Even where they increased substantially, as 
in Germany, it was mostly through individual, non-contractual steps 
whose pace was unilaterally established by employers18. For a good 
many years the changing character of the labor force, and the 
imperatives of political stability and social peace, prevented even 
those unions which shared the culture of growth and productivity 
(and its political commitment) from exercising a strong bargaining 
role. This situation changed only at the end of the decade, and 
even more substantially in the 1960s. The younger generation of 
manufacturing workers had by then adjusted to industrial work, 
gradually dropping the submissive attitude produced by sudden 
change and a relative improvement of income, and integrating itself 
in the habits of collective bargaining and union representation. 
Conditions of sustained full employment, together with a more 
relaxed political climate, allowed unions to press forward with 
aggressive demands. The two diverse sectors, or generations, of 
manufacturing workers were reunited in a single powerful group kept 
together by a tight labor market , where even the large inflow of 
foreign immigrants (in France and especially in Germany) could not 
seriously undermine labor bargaining power and prevent wages from 
rising. Unionization was also spreading to many non manufacturing 
sectors of the labor force, and trade unions emerged in the second 




























































































economic bargaining among social interests and in the determination 
of national public policies19.
Nonetheless, in the first decade of the European boom the 
intense modernization of industry, aimed at the attainment of 
stronger positions on international markets, had taken the utmost 
advantage from a large supply of labor whose shifting character had 
assured wage stability and almost unchallenged managerial control 
upon manpower. In fact the deep, competitive restructuring of 
industry, fostered by the widely perceived necessity to assure the 
viability of each nation's economy in an interdependent world - 
where the ability to export was to be the measure of a country's 
economic power and survival -, had undermined the traditional 
strongholds of political unionism while also postponing the coming 
of age of a new, productivity-oriented unionism. Therefore, 
powerlessness in industry - in the early 1950s - prevented labor 
from successfully playing its part in the neo-corporatist schemes 
devised by the policies of American aid. At the same time, such 
schemes always appeared as inherently limited and unpromising to 
most European unionists. Either for their long-standing political 
tradition, for the necessity to develop strong links with political 
parties or, more importantly, for the conscious need to overcome 
their ineffectiveness in a divided labor market, European unions 
in most cases looked forward to a much more ambitious and 
influential integration at the level of national policy-making. It 
was not just the result of that long history of political unionism 




























































































political confrontation of the Cold War years, union organizations 
were considered as essential providers of social consensus, and 
their political support was actively sought after, both by 
government and opposition parties. It was then quite natural that 
trade union leaders tried to achieve - in return for their 
disciplined and responsible attitude towards national growth - a 
major role in the determination of overall economic policies. More 
to the point, however, was the strategic thinking of labor 
organizations. Precisely because of the temporarily debilitating 
effects that the restructuring of industry had upon their 
bargaining power, trade unions generally looked at the investment 
boom (and it took them a few years to realize that they were really 
facing a sustained boom) as to something that had to be corrected 
and balanced by a growth of social expenditure and of low income 
group's consumption. Throughout the 1950s unions tended to conceive 
of themselves more as a general interest pressure group for the 
growth of internal demand and employment than as a specific 
bargaining agent for occupied wage earners20. This obviously derived 
from the perception of their weakness in a fragmented and shifting 
labor market, but it paradoxically projected them on a more 
ambitious course which contemplated their participation in the 
management of public institutions of general welfare and the 
negotiation of macroeconomic policies. In the early 1950s this 
often looked as escapism from the hardship brought upon them by the 
restructuring of national economies for the sake of international 




























































































a reality, these strategies afforded a political integration of 
labor unions at a much higher and more comprehensive level than the 
one conceived by American newdealist planners.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
The above discussion leads to two conclusive arguments. The 
first one concerns a comparison of the different challenges faced 
by labor movements in the early 1950s, and of their diverse 
responses. The established view of the recovery of the European 
economy as an export-led boom has been increasingly questioned and 
criticized, in recent research, as a gross underestimation of the 
growth of internal markets21. Even within this new view, however, 
the fear of foreign competitors remains as one of the central 
factors behind business investment strategies, and most government 
policies, aimed at increased productivity. The intense 
restructuring of national economies which nourished the boom was 
largely shaped by widespread and profound anxieties about each 
nation's ability to compete, and even survive, on international 
markets. It was the battle for exports and foreign currency, for 
a long-term diminished vulnerability to, and larger presence in, 
international trade, wich set the standard parameters by which 
industrial efficiency was judged and pushed forward. The evidences 
pointing to a rapid growth of domestic markets provide for a 
healthy revision of stagnationist analysis of national growth. In 




























































































factor does not at all reduce the relevance of competitiveness in 
the international economy as the main concern behind the 
modernization of industry and the public policies for larger 
output, which eventually found the answer to the domestic 
imperatives for growth in 'an institutionalized pattern of economic 
interdependence' . It is upon this background that the major 
difference in the conditions faced by European and American labor 
movements comes clear. European unions simply could not entrench 
themselves - as the American did - in relatively sheltered sectors 
of industry where the cost of almost parallel gains in productivity 
and wages would not decisively damage production performances 
largely aimed at a domestic market. European unions were, for a few 
years, much more vulnerable to the internationally-oriented 
restructuring of industry23, and no American scheme for neo- 
corporatist partnership could relieve them from the burden of - 
actual and perceived - interdependence.
The second conclusion is related to the established view that 
the boom was accompanied by a keynesian consensus on the importance 
of full employment as the long-term goal of governments' policies 
throughout the boom. If we consider the whole period of roughly 25 
years of sustained growth, there is no doubt that the commitment 
to avoid depression and maximize employment stands out as the 
consistent response given by government institutions and political 
parties to the social demands channeled through the electoral 
process. But this general, apparent truth requires further 




























































































chronological development of the policies adopted in order to 
pursue that long-term priority; and the second is a more detailed 
analysis of the actual mechanisms of the political competition for 
social consensus which resulted in the imperative of employment 
maximization.
We are used to consider the urge towards a full employment 
economy either as the product of a global demand generating from 
society after the disastrous experience of the 1930s, or as the 
effect of a political pressure coming from the left-wing24. These 
two factors should be seen as complementary, and functionally 
related, rather than mutually exclusive: their interaction was the 
central factor of the political game in the new postwar electoral 
democracies. It was precisely because the political competition - 
centered on the consensus of large, but differentiated masses of 
voters - was always open to a challenge and to the possibility of 
defeat, that conservative politicians and centrist governments had 
to define their strategies in terms of no depression and maximum 
employment. It was not a matter of direct electoral defeat by 
leftist parties (this possibility, in a few cases, emerged only in 
the late 1960s), but rather the risk that the constant building up 
and reshaping of social coalitions, which assured electoral 
success, could be arrested, slowed down or reversed. Delivering 
sustained growth and ever-increasing employment, year after year, 
was an inescapable necessity in the endless search for a consensus 
which could never been taken for granted, once and for all on a 




























































































shifting fashion. Centrist governments somehow had to constantly 
buy their own time: trying to keep one step ahead, through ever- 
increasing growth, of social demands and expectations that could 
at any moment turn into destabilizing, centrifugal political 
behaviour. This was particularly relevant in so far as industrial 
workers were concerned.
Besides, when we look at the initial stage of the boom we have 
to take into consideration the political confrontation and 
settlement which set such mechanism in motion. The almost obsessive 
fear of a break-down of the newly aquired political stability of 
France, Germany and Italy, up to at least 1952-3, can easily be 
discarded as a peculiar and exaggerated attitude of American 
diplomats and observers. Nonetheless, the Cold War politics of 
anticommunism were a real and influential factor in defining the 
nature of the competitive political process. The breaking up of 
trade unions1 potential power to resist the restructuring of 
industry; the opening up of the labor market in order to reduce 
labor' ability to freeze industry into an uncompetitive position; 
these were not just American Cold War goals pursued through 
Marshall aid: they were considered as the necessary preconditions 
for an effective management of the boom by centrist governments. 
Isolating labor into temporary powerlessness was not so much a 
function of ideological anticommunism, but rather the starting 
point for the political viability of centrist coalitions bound to 




























































































in order to keep one step ahead in the race for electoral consensus 
by means of sustained growth.
Since the modernization of industry was deemed indispensable 
- in order to reach a high employment economy in an interdependent 
world then an initial stage with relatively stable wages and a 
manageable mobility of the labor force was needed. This meant a 
restriction of unions' bargaining power and a parallel 
marginalization of the leftist parties. Then, and only then, the 
political and electoral mechanism of dynamic consensus through 
growth would begin to operate. Growth would deliver rising 
prosperity to increasingly larger social groups - presumably 
starting with middle classes and, on a much lower level, with those 
new industrial workers whose entering into manufacturing shifted 
and altered the social basis upon which any seriously conceivable 
challenge from the left had to be based. Thus political stability 
came into being as the net result of continuous movements of 
income, employment and social alliances. The dynamics of growth 
constantly reshaped the geography of social consensus, maintaining 
the threat of a political alternative in an embryonic state, and 
allowing governing coalitions to keep afloat even in the presence 
of still relatively large rates of unemployment. Only when full 
employment was actually reached, the social and political challenge 
from leftist oppositions did seriously materialize; but its threat 
had somehow always been there, as one of the hidden engines which 
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